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INTRODUCTION
Most existing theoretical analysis of the professional sports league industry has focused on leagues where the objective of individual clubs 1 is either profit maximization, or maximization of win percentage (equivalent to maximizing relative team quality) subject to a budget constraint 2 . The conventional view is that profit maximization may approximate reasonably well behaviour in the major North American sports leagues where clubs seem largely to have been run on the lines of businesses in other industries, but win maximization may be more prevalent in European football (soccer), where wealthy club owners have seemingly been prepared to forego profit to produce champion teams. In a recent paper Madden (2010) introduced a third alternative, namely fan welfare maximization, whereby (again subject to a budget constraint, and motivated by the observed members' clubs in European football) the fans or supporters of a club, who have a particular allegiance to the club and are the consumers of its products, also have direct control over club policies. In reality however one might reasonably expect that club objectives are more complicated, multi-dimensional objects, "utility functions" to use the term suggested in one of the early and now much-cited papers in the literature (Sloane (1971) ). The current paper provides a first analysis of sports leagues with clubs whose objectives are utility functions defined over profits, win percentage and fan welfare 3 , thus combining (with varying weights) the three objectives studied separately elsewhere.
A particular motivation stems from the emerging and growing role for supporters' trusts in UK football 4 , where these associations of fans of a club are gradually acquiring increased representation on club boards, and so increased influence on the club decision processes. Whilst financial issues at various clubs in the English Premiership are currently creating significant pressure for supporter involvement in governance of clubs from this top tier of English soccer 5 , to date an actual supporter trust presence on club boards is restricted to lower league levels; section 2 of the paper will elaborate further details. The general tendency triggers questions, both 1 We use the following terms solely with their sporting meanings; club, team, match, player. However games refer to their usual meaning in economic models. 2 Coverage of the literature can be found in the major surveys of Fort and Quirk (1995) and Szymanski (2003) , the textbooks by Fort (2006) and Sandy et al. (2004) , and in the materials for the increasing numbers of courses on Sports Economics being taught around the world. The book by Kesenne (2007) provides a full account of existing results on both profit and win maximization. 3 Although some authors have used the term utility maximization to refer to the univariate win maximization objective, the only paper that has previously addressed a multi-variate objective is Rashcer (1997) , where profits and win percentage were the two arguments. We add fan welfare, and argue later that this provides a close approximation to Sloane's (1971) original suggestion. 4 Michie et al. (2006) provide information on governance of UK soccer clubs, and the role of supporters' trusts in particular. 5 The reaction against the North American owners of Manchester United (the Glazer family), and the heavy debts and higher ticket prices that the club has acquired since the Glazer takeover has led (at the time of writing, April 2010) to the formation of a group of wealthy, influential supporters, who are attempting to launch a takeover, working with the Manchester United supporters' trust (MUST) whose membership has grown rapidly to over 100,000 in the last months. Negative reaction to the debts following a North American based takeover, and attempts to launch a supporter led alternative have also been seen at Liverpool. For the first time in history, a Premier League club (Portsmouth) has gone into receivership recently, immediately preceded by the launch and rapid growth of a supporters' trust for the club. Supporter ownership of football clubs has in fact become an item on the political agenda in the run-up to the 2010 UK General Election.
positive and normative, about the affects that the increasing power of supporters in club governance will have, questions which we aim to answer by investigating the consequences of increased weight on fan welfare in clubs' utility functions.
We take a simplified, basic framework that has been used in the previous literature for the study of profit and win maximization and in Madden (2010) for fan welfare maximization, and add the utility maximization analysis. With European football in mind and its relatively fierce inter-league competition for players, this established framework assumes a perfectly elastic supply of playing talent to the league, which consists of 2 clubs that play each other twice over the season, once at home and once away in stadiums of given large capacity. Clubs earn revenue from attendance by their fans at their home game and incur the costs of hiring playing talent, making decisions on ticket prices for entry to their home game and on their expenditure on playing talent. As suggested above, the focus on the positive economics side will be on the affects of changing the weights on the arguments of the utility function on ticket prices, player expenditures and the resulting match attendances. Normatively, the question to be answered will be whether these utility weight changes are a good thing in terms of welfare (aggregate surplus).
We start in section 2 with an account of the emergence of supporters' trusts in English football and their current influence on club governance and decisions. Section 3 sets out the model of a league with utility maximizing clubs, section 4 analyses individual club decisions in this framework and section 5 looks at league outcomes (Nash equilibria) and welfare. Section 6 concludes.
SUPPORTERS' TRUSTS IN ENGLISH FOOTBALL
We first consider the mechanism by which supporters interests will be heard in English football. Like other companies operating in the UK, football clubs are owned by their shareholders and administered by a board of directors headed by a chairman (Michie et al. (2006) ). Unlike other companies however, the chairman of a football club is often the major shareholder of the club or the outright owner. This means that the chairman has a major influence on the general strategy of the club. For fan welfare to become a priority, therefore, a club would require an altruistic chairman, or other influential board member, for whom this was a main concern, or supporter representation on the Board.
Historically supporters have had a significant influence on the policies of many football clubs in continental Europe ( Szymanski (2008) ). For example, at FC Barcelona the current membership of over 150,000 pay 150 euro each year and are represented by a randomly-selected group who meet with the board and vote on major decisions. These representatives have a major say on significant issues such as sponsorship, finances and sporting affairs, while the president of the club is elected in four-yearly polls. All German football clubs are required to have at least 51% member ownership 6 . These observed ownership structures of many clubs in continental Europe are predominantly a result of the fact that these clubs were set up as sporting clubs 8 incorporating other activities apart from football ( Szymanski (2008) ).
The associations governing these clubs have maintained strict guidelines on public share issues and have restrictions on ownership (Brown and Walsh (2000, p.89) ).
Ironically, many English football clubs were initially founded as member's associations. Taylor (1992) provides an example of this in Leicester Fosse F.C (later to become Leicester City F.C.) which was formed in 1884 by members who elected a committee to run the club's affairs. Within a short time there were sixty-five members overseeing three teams. This reflects the originally simple democratic structure of most English clubs; one member, one vote to elect a committee to administer club affairs. However early pressure to create a winning team attracted wealthy backers, including banks, who loaned the club money. Financial problems ensued leading to clubs' applications for private limited company status. The original committee then became the board of directors.
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Once clubs became public limited companies, supporters had very little success in their attempts to acquire some effective representation on their board and were forced to be satisfied by forming supporters groups. This situation changed in 1985 with the formation of the Football Supporters Association (FSA) 8 , an independent body set up to represent the concerns of all supporters. The activities of the FSA, combined with the experiences of groups of supporters of lower-league clubs who had provided fundraising and organisational assistance to clubs during severe financial difficulties, brought the active role that supporters can play to public prominence. This prompted the Labour Government to set up the Football Task Force in 1997 which was given a remit to produce three reports (the first two dealt with disability and racism) on how to improve the modern game. The Task Force's third report, Investing in the Community (Football Task Force (1999) ), contained the suggestion that the government should assist supporters who want to acquire a meaningful stake in their club and led to the formation of Supporters Direct 9 .
Supporters Direct is an externally-funded non-governmental mutual organisation. Its stated aim is: "Through establishing and developing supporters' trusts, we aim to bring about responsible, democratic representation at spectator sports clubs, and so help promote the highest standards of governance, accountability and embed those clubs deeper into their communities. 
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There is by now a group of clubs where supporters have some direct influence on club governance operating alongside a larger population of clubs with a traditional governance structure. Firstly, we require a more precise definition of "supporter involvement". We have obtained data from Supporters Direct on three methods by which supporters trusts have involvement in their clubs. Firstly, some clubs are fully owned by supporters trusts. Secondly, there are clubs with a supporters trust director on the board and finally, clubs for which the supporters trust shareholding is greater than ten per cent. Many of the clubs that fall into these categories are non-league clubs (below tier 4 in the hierarchy), and none are from the top tier Premier League. We concentrate on clubs from the Football League divisions 1 and 2 (tiers 3 and 4) to avoid the problem of comparing professional and non-professional clubs. Table 1 shows details of fourteen Football League clubs that comply with our above definition of supporter involvement, and have operated in these two divisions. As can be seen from the Table, some clubs meet all three criteria, and some clubs only two. For example, Brentford Football Club is owned by the supporters trust, and so obviously has a director on the club board. The supporters trust also has a shareholding of sixty per cent in this club. However, the supporters trust at Sheffield Wednesday FC, whilst having a member on the club board, only has a shareholding of ten per cent. Hence supporters will have a different level of involvement in these clubs. We can reasonably make the assumption that the weight on fan welfare is greater for the clubs in Table 1 than for other league clubs. Ideally, we would proceed by comparing the key variables of ticket prices, attendances and wage expenditure for these two groups of clubs to see if interesting patterns emerge. We are faced with two stumbling blocks, however. Firstly, there is the paucity of the data available. Historical data on ticket prices was unobtainable although we do provide information on current ticket prices below. Moreover, many of the clubs in our sample did not file accounts during the period of interest meaning that data on wage expenditure was unavailable. The second stumbling block when making comparisons is the issue of promotion and relegation between divisions. Wage expenditure, attendances and ticket prices will vary depending on which division of a league a club is operating in. All these variables will tend to be higher the further up the league hierarchy the club climbs.
In an attempt to obviate these problems, we focus on two clubs whose league position was relatively stable around the period in which they made the transition to supporter involvement. This will enable us to assess the extent to which the characteristics of these clubs changed over time once supporter welfare became more important 11 . Tables 2 and 3 provide data on league position, real wage expenditure, and attendances for Brentford F. C. and Lincoln City F.C for four seasons before and after the transition to effective supporter involvement. Brentford F.C. supporters trust is called Bees United and was formed in April 2001 with the objective of giving ordinary football supporters greater involvement in the future of the club. The trust acquired the majority shareholding (60%) in Brentford F. C. on January 20th 2006. Bees United has loaned over £1.4m to Brentford F. C. and now has four director 11 A static comparison of average attendances is worthless since this takes no account of a clubs fan base.
Despite only having a sample of 14 SI teams we estimate a regression of a simple model of attendances to evaluate whether there is any systematic difference between SI and non SI teams;. ATT i,t = -1573.7 + 0.002 MKT SIZE i,t + 13143.7 WINPERCENT i,t + 22.37SI. The variables are defined as follows. ATT is the seasonal average attendance of each club in Football Leagues 1 and 2 in seasons 2006-7, 2007-8 and 2008-9 . MKT SIZE is (log) population (millions) in the inner/outer zones of a club's catchment area. WINPERCENT , is the percentage of games won by team i in season t, where a draw is counted as half a win. SI = 1 if a club is an SI club and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on MKT SIZE and WINPERCENT are positive, as one would expect. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable, SI, shows that, on average for our sample, that SI clubs attracted 22 more supporters than non-SI clubs. The number is small, but statistically significant. Obviously, this model also ignores the issue of divisional change over this period.
places on the eight-seat football club board. The Lincoln City supporters' trust or Imps Trust was formed in 2001 and holds nearly 25%, of the club's shares in addition to two trust board members on the club board. The trust has over 1,400 members, and between 2001 and 2008 donated over a quarter of a million pounds to the club. Both of these clubs remained in the bottom two tiers of the English league both before and after SI. Brentford operated mainly in the third tier (League 1) despite suffering a relegation in 2005-6, and Lincoln City mainly in the fourth tier (League 2) with one season in the third tier in 1998-99. As can be seen from pre-and post-SI mean values real wage expenditure fell and average seasonal attendances rose after the weight on supporter welfare increased. Notes: League Position is calculated as position in entire league hierarchy (top of premier league = 1), Real wages were deflated using RPI: 1987 = 100
Finally, we compare the current ticket prices of the two groups of clubs. If fan welfare is an important argument in the club's utility function then a priori we may expect admission prices for clubs with supporters involvement (SI Clubs) to be lower than conventionally owned clubs (Non SI clubs). Table 4 displays average ticket prices for the two groups for the season 2009-10 12 ; the clubs used for the comparison can be found in the Appendix. It can be seen that the mean ticket price is lower for SI clubs than for non-SI clubs for that season, although this was not statistically significant even at the 10% level. 
LEAGUES WITH UTILITY MAXIMIZING CLUBS: A MODEL
We now present a simple economic model of a league with utility maximizing clubs; the framework is similar to those found in previous literature, e.g. Madden (2010) .
Two clubs and their teams comprise the league; each team plays the other twice over the season, once at home and once away. Club i=1,2 has a stadium where its team plays its home match; the stadium has a given capacity, sufficiently large so as to be never binding on match attendance 13 . Clubs hire players and 0  i Q denotes the expenditure on playing talent by team i. Following the established treatment for a European football league, talent is in perfectly elastic supply at a wage normalised to 1, so i Q is also the quantity of playing talent (and alternatively a measure of the quality of team i). Player expenditures are the only club costs, abstracting (e.g.) from stadium costs, as is usual in the literature.
Club i sets the ticket price i p for admission to its home match and receives all gate revenue from this match; no price discrimination is possible. There are disjoint sets of fans of each club i, who feel an (exogenously given) affinity to club i. In a terminology used in the literature, our fans are core rather than floating fans -a fan of club i could not switch allegiance to the rival club 14 . To simplify, it is assumed that 12 It may be instructive to make an inter-season comparison of ticket prices, but historical data for individual English clubs is notoriously difficult to obtain, unlike current prices which are publicly available. 13 In the context of Football Leagues 1 and 2, this assumption is entirely appropriate, where attendances are almost always significantly below capacity. The average attendance as a percentage of capacity for League One (3 rd tier) was 53% for the 2006-7 season and 54% for the 2007-8 season. The same figures for League Two (4 th tier) are 39% and 38% respectively (Deloitte and Touche 2008, 2009 ). 14 Partisanship is an often assumed characteristic of football supporters. However there is evidence that certainly not all fans are core in this sense -see Robinson (2009 
is symmetric, fans are nonpartisan and would divide a given amount of talent equally between the 2 teams for their optimal match. In our context, with core fans in mind with their wish to see their team win, an asymmetry leading to more talent going to the home team for a fan's optimal match is appropriate. This fan bias is captured by the assumption that A fan with heterogeneity parameter x will demand a ticket if
and profits
, which is the first club utility function argument.
Once talent has been hired and tickets sold, matches are played and a winner emerges. Ex ante, before the play of matches, the probability that i is the winner is some The final club utility function argument is their fan welfare, defined to be the following aggregate surplus accruing to their fans; 15 Given that away fan attendance is always a small fraction of attendance, the assumption is plausible. 16 Implicitly we are assuming that the full fan utility function is quasi-linear, defined over a numeraire (endowment y and large) and the match ticket. Full utility is then y without the ticket and
with the ticket. 17 One could strengthen the fan "affinity" by assuming that ) , (
is strictly increasing only on some large enough cone in the ) , (
plane, but this adds nothing to the analysis and is not pursued. 18 The fan utility microfoundation essentially generalises that of Falconieri et al. (2004) who assume the specific Cobb-Douglas form
with non-partisan fans for their TV audience
Notice that fan welfare is a monotone transformation of attendance.
A club's utility function is assumed to be a weighted average of profits, win percentage and fan welfare, where
are the non-negative weights 20 :
The clubs make independent decisions about ticket prices ( i p ) and player expenditure ( i Q ) to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, which is taken for simplicity to be the non-negative profit requirement. So the decision problem for a utility maximizing club is:
ANALYSIS OF CLUB DECISIONS
We consider the ticket price ( Figure 4 .1.
To find optimal ticket prices and player expenditures we proceed in 2 stages, solving first for optimal prices given both j Q and i Q , and then solving for the optimal i Q .
For univariate or "pure" objectives (with a positive weight on only one utility argument), the optimal prices are obvious -monopoly prices for the pure profitmaximizer, low break-even prices for the pure fan welfare maximizer, with indifference to all prices between high and low break-even levels for the pure win maximizer where price does not affect the objective. Using this, Madden (2010) shows that the resulting optimal player expenditures lead to a point  in Figure 4 .1 under pure profit maximization, to W with a pure win maximizer, and to F under pure fan welfare maximization. Precisely, and unambiguously, player expenditure is highest at W and lowest at  ; match attendance is highest at F and lowest at  ; and ticket price is highest at W. Or, with obvious notation,
Optimal prices will be low break-even, since 0  iF  means there is always a benefit to utility from lowering price and thereby increasing attendance and fan welfare, exactly as with the pure fan welfare maximizer, and this has no effect on win percentage. Utility is ) , ( ) , ( 2 2
which has the following feature ensuring that its stationary point is a global maximum; 
Proof See appendix.
The content is as follows, illustrated in Figure 4 .2. First, if there is no weight on fan
, utility maximizing pricing is just monopoly pricing, along M in . Notice that, as one would expect, for given weights the ticket price always increases with home team player expenditure (=home team quality), and, for given home and away team qualities (i.e. for a given match quality), the price always falls as the fan welfare weight increases. 

, substitution of the pricing rule from Lemma 4.2 into utility gives;
Some preliminary points about this function are the following.
(i) Under our assumptions both top and bottom branches of (4.2) define differentiable functions of i Q . But in fact (after some tedious calculations -details omitted) derivatives of both branches are the same at ) , ( 
. Thus the optimal player expenditure for a utility maximizer is always at least as large as that of a pure profit maximizer. (iii) Again from Lemma 4.1 , it follows that i U is strictly concave in 
is a best response to j Q with zero profits iff ) , (
The question of main interest in this section is now addressed; how do optimal prices, player expenditures and the implied match attendances change as the utility function weights change? Local comparative static answers are provided. 
LEAGUE EQUILIBRIA AND AGGREGATE SURPLUS
We now turn to the Nash equilibria of the normal form game where the players are the 2 utility maximizing clubs in the league (called the U-league), strategy sets are 2 , 1 , 0   i Q i and payoffs are either
or 0 otherwise. The formulation allows utility function weights to differ between clubs, as well as their fanbases, and has the special cases studied in Madden (2010) of the   league (2 pure profit maximizers), the F-league (2 pure fan welfare maximizers) and the W-league (2 pure win maximizers). The previous section provided information on club best responses in the general U-league game, which will be the basis for the U-league Nash equilibrium analysis to follow. There is essentially no loss of generality in assuming that 2 , (with ) i j  define the sum of consumer (fan) and producer surplus for that club to be:
The usual sum of these surpluses is our welfare measure. This aggregate surplus is denoted
, and
will denote surplus values in U-league equilibria.
A driving force behind all the results in Section 5 will be the elementary inefficiency of monopoly. The core nature of our fans, who cannot switch allegiance to the rival club, endows clubs with monopoly power in the sale of tickets to their fans. Positive weight on profits in club objectives can lead to some of this elementary inefficiency. Thus, loosely at the moment, positive profits are not a good thing from the aggregate surplus viewpoint. , the (pure win maximizing) behaviour of club i can be approximated with
Notice that our assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of playing talent means that players gain no extra surplus from playing in our league, and so do not enter the social welfare evaluation. Given the supply assumption, this seems appropriate, but differs from the social welfare specifications analysed in Falconieri et al. (2004) who also have the perfectly elastic supply assumption. Also, with quasilinear utility for fans (footnote 11), maximization of this aggregate surplus equates in the usual way to Pareto efficiency, legitimising the use of If one thinks of an aggregate surplus maximizing planner with the power to influence the nature of club governance via the utility weights, then the optimum for this planner will imply that for each club either the weight on win percentage is zero, or profits are zero in the resulting U-league equilibrium.
To go beyond this first and general result requires more structure. The following formulae, found by substituting utility maximizing prices from Lemma 4.1 into (5.1), are useful in the next 2 sub-sections;
Leagues with strategic independence
A useful benchmark is the special case where the game entails global strategic independence, and the best response results of Section 4 provide immediate information on U-league equilibria. Naturally the conditions required are quite restrictive. Specifically we assume first that fans are completely home partisan in that ) , ( 24 An example of a contest success function with the desired properties is a difference form (Skaperdas (1996) 
A much stronger result than Theorem 5.1 is now available 25 ;
Theorem 5.2 In a U-league with strategic independence, the value of aggregate surplus in the F-league equilibrium (with 2 pure fan welfare maximizers) is greater than its value in any other U-league equilibrium. Proof See appendix.
The social welfare maximising planner referred to earlier, would now want all clubs to place positive weight only on fan welfare in their objectives. All clubs should be supporter owned, as is currently the case only at Brentford and Exeter in Football Leagues 1 and 2. But the assumptions that lead to these conclusions are strong; so we relax them next.
Strategic complementarity
In this section we weaken the strategic independence assumption to allow also strategic complementarity, making the following first assumptions;
This seems a natural assumption on fan preferences -increases in rival team quality increase the amount a fan is willing to pay for an increase in the quality of their team. We also assume; 
The best response problems faced by utility maximizing clubs always generate continuous reaction functions under the general assumptions made here. (A1) and (A2) ensure that these functions are (weakly) upward sloping whenever they are differentiable which ensures (weak) global strategic complementarity; This final result is not as definitive as Theorem 5.2, but the assumptions are reasonable. If our planner observed positive profits being taken from a club, then this indicates a social sub-optimality; increasing the weight on fan welfare in such a club's objective (perhaps by increasing supporter representation on the board) is needed to effect an improvement. The lack of positive profits in Football Leagues 1 and 2 is not an indication of a poorly performing industry -quite the opposite.
CONCLUSIONS
Formalising one of the seminal ideas in the literature on the economics of professional sports leagues (Sloane (1971) ), the paper has provided a model of club decisions on player expenditure and match ticket prices in such a league, where club objectives (utility functions in Sloane's terminology) are a weighted average of profits, win percentages and the welfare of the club's fans. The effects of changes in utility function weights have been traced, for player expenditure, match ticket prices and attendances, and for the resulting aggregate surplus. Particular attention has been given to the effects of changing the weight on fan welfare, to capture the recent and increasing influence of supporters' trusts on club governance in the English Football Leagues 1 and 2 (tiers 3 and 4 in the hierarchy).
The local comparative static effects of an increase in the fan welfare utility weight depend in general on club profitability. If a club is making positive profits, the increase will definitely also increase player expenditure (equated here to team quality), although the effect on ticket prices is more ambiguous -holding team quality fixed would certainly produce a fall in the match ticket price, but an increase in ticket price to accompany the increased team quality is also a possibility. For an unprofitable club (zero profit in the model) the effects are a (now definite) fall in ticket price, but team quality typically also decreases. However, irrespective of profitability, the effects on match attendances are clear and unambiguous -increase in the fan welfare utility weight will increase attendances.
The emerging influence of supporters' trusts on club governance in the Football League is too short-lived to provide definitive data and tests. However the theoretical 23 results are consistent with the limited data we have been able to collect for clubs in Football Leagues 1 and 2, namely that increased supporter trust involvement in club governance (interpreted as an increase in the fan welfare utility weight) has led to an increase in attendances. The data also indicate zero (rather than positive) profits, and lower ticket prices and player expenditure when there is supporter involvement in governance, again consistent with the comparative static results 27 .
Normatively, in an extreme (strategic independence) case, it should be the case that clubs' objectives reflect only the interests of their fans, with zero profits; club ownership by fans (as currently at Brentford and Exeter in the Football League) would be a good thing. Under more reasonable (strategic complementarity) assumptions, the theoretical results still point clearly towards the conclusion that the observation of positive profits accruing to owners would not be a good thing, and increased supporter involvement in governance (e.g. increased supporter trust representation on club boards) is needed to improve performance. For such leagues, zero rather than positive profits are a better indication of a socially healthy league.
APPENDIX
Clubs used for 
which has the sign of
whose last term is positive as 
The first term on the right hand side is negative since Since the stationary point involves a price less than the monopoly (and so the high break-even) price, it will be the utility maximizing price if it exceeds ) , ( 
